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NOTE AND COMMENT 
Tm~ APPAJJI. CAs:e.-On :March 6 last the Supreme Court handed down 
a unanimous decision in the appeals taken in the libel suits filed against 
the Appam and cargo in the District Court of the United States for the 
Eastern Di_strict of Virginia, affirming the decree of. restitution entered 
by that court. 
On February I, 19I6, the Appam, a British merchantman captured upon 
the high seas on January IS by the German cruiser Moewe, arrived in 
charge of a prize master and crew at Hampton Roads, Virginia, after a 
voyage nearly twice as long as that to the nearest German port. The prize 
master's commission authorized him to take the vessel to the nearest 
American port and to lay her up. The German Ambassador in a letter of 
February 2, notified the Secretary of State of the vessel's arrival and of 
the intention of the commanding officer "to stay in an American port until 
further notice." (Cf. IO AM. Joun. !NT. LAW (Supp., Oct., 1916), 387). 
The modem practice of nations in dealing with prizes is for the captor 
to take them for condemnation before a prize court sitting in his country. 
It was formerly the custom for belligerents to bring prizes into neutral ports, 
although it was clearly recognized that such entry, except under special 
treaty stipulations to that effect, was accorded the belligerent not as of right, 
but as a privilege at the discretion of the neutral. DAVIS, OuTLIN:es OF lNT. 
'LAW, 26I-262; l\:foott, INT. LAw DIG., g83; Woor.s:ev, INT. LAW, 267; HAuT:e-
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li'tUILLS, Dts DROITS '1!:r Dl':S Dr:voms Dl':S NATIONS N:r:uTRr:s r:N 'ttMl'S D:r; 
GU£RRr: MARITIM:r;, 352. The whole trend of modern practice has been, 
however, to limit this entry very strictly to certain well-defined cases. "The 
modern practice of neutrals prohibits the use of their ports by the prizes 
of a belligerent, except in case~ of necessity; and they may remain in the 
ports only for the meeting of the exigency. The necessity must be one 
arising from the perils of the seas, or. need of repairs· for seaworthiness, or 
provisions and supplies. * * * In the list of necessities, the general danger 
of a passage, from the vigilance or superioi:ity of the enemy, it would seem, 
should not be included, although· no decision on that precise point is known." 
Wm~A'tON, !NT. LAw (ed. Dana), 486-487 note; cf. also 2 On:r:Nm:rM, INT. 
LAW (2d. Ed.), 395-396; ·HAI.L, TR:r:ATrs:r: ON INT. LAW, 623; DAVIS, op. cit., 
261-262; Mooa:r:, INT. LAW Dre., !)82, 985. Such has also been the practice 
of the United States. Mooa:r:, OP.. cit., '936, 937, 938. The modern attitude 
on this question is very clearly shown by the close restrictions of the pro-
visions of Articles 21 and 22 of The Hague Convention XIII of 1907, adopted 
by a large majonty ~of' the nations, although not in force in the present 
war. The Appam, therefore, as not being according to the well-substantiated 
facts entitled thereto under any of the above .exceptions of necessity, had, it 
is submitted, no right under the general principles of International Law to 
entry into- a neutral American port. 
The German Government rested 'i~s claim, however, upon what were 
conceived to be the special privileges conceded to her by the provisions 
of Article XIX of the Prusso-American Treaty of 1799, as renewed in 1828. 
Cf. Letters of Feb. 2 and Feb. 22, 1916, from German Ambassador to 
Secretary of State, in IO AM. JoUR. INT. LAW (Supp., Oct., 1916), 387,' 391; 
also telegram from German Government, ibid., p. 390. 
This treaty, originally negotiated in 1785, was entered into in 1799 and 
renewed in 1828 by Prussia and the United States ; and although there is 
in theory ground for the contention that treaties made by a component 
state of the German Empire prior to the formation of the latter are not 
binding upon the Empire, this Treaty has been frequently recognized as 
valid and rights claimed and obligations performed under it. (Statement 
of the German Foreign Secretary before the Reichstag, May 31, 1897.) Its 
validity was officially recognized by Pntssia at the outbreak of the Civil 
War in 1861, by the United States and the North German Confederation in 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in the Lusitania Note of May 13, 
1915, and in the Frye case in 1915. (Based on KRAu:r;t, EIN Vo:r:LK:r:RR:r:CHT-
LIClllm STRr:rTFALL, in KoHL:r:R, Z:r:ITSCHRIFT Fu:r:R Vo:r:LK:r:RR:r:CHT for January, 
1916, pp. n-19.) In Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, the Supreme Court 
recognized the continuous validity of treaties made by the United States 
and the component states of the German Empire, the political departments 
of both countries having previously decided such question in the affirmative. 
The Appam, therefore, as a German prize seeking entry into a neutral 
American port, was entitled to the enjoyment of such rights and privileges 
of entry and of such only as are granted and contemplated by the provisions 
of _Article XIX of that Treaty. · 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
The Treaty with Prussia was one of a series of commercial treaties 
made by the United States with the leading maritime states of Europe-with 
France in 1778, with Holland in 1782, with Sweden in 1783, with England 
-in 1794- In these treaties, except that with Holland, the reception of prizes 
in the ports of the neutral is regulated by provisions of the same general 
tenor, the differences being in the main in phraseology. On August 28, 
18o1, President Jefferson wrote to Gallatin about the French Treaty, "The 
treaties give a right to armed vessels, with their prizes, to go where they 
please (consequently into our ports), and that these prizes shall not be 
detained, seized, nor adjudicated, but that the armed yessel may depart 
as speedily as possible, with her prize, to the place of her commission. * * * 
These stipulations admit the prizes to put into our ports in cases of necessity, 
or perhaps of convenience, but no·right to remain if disagreeable to us; and 
absolutely not to be sold." Mooiu:, op. cit, VII. 936. It would seem, then, 
that the interpretation put by the Secretary of State upon Article XIX as 
providing only temporary asylum for prizes under convoy by the captor 
vessel is in strict accord, not only with the general practice of the United 
States, but also with the interpretation officially put by the Government upon 
similar treaty provisions from the beginning. Cf. Letters of March 2 and 
of April 7, 1916, from Secretary of State to German Ambassador, in AM. 
}OUR. INT. LAW, X, Supp., Oct, 1916, pp. 393-395, 401-403. The German 
Government protested against this "especialy strict interpretation" of the 
Treaty, urging the facile· contention that the modem practice of naval 
warfare should modify the strict terms of the stipulation so as to permit 
entry of unconvoyed prizes in conformity with modem methods of sen.ding 
prizes to the home port under a prize crew. German Memorandum of 
March 16, 1916, in AM. }OUR. INT. LAW, X, Supp., Oct, 1916, pp. 397-399. 
A treaty is in essence a bargain whereby the contracting parties seek to 
accommodate their aims and interests in such fashion as will secure to 
each the greatest amount of advantage possible. Provision is balanced 
against provision, and it is submitted that no unilateral extension of the 
strict terms of any provision can be admitted under the general principles 
of treaty construction (cf. Woor.s:EY, INT. LAW, pp. 185-186), a restriction 
of all the greater force when it is borne in mind that. the. provision thus 
proposed to be extended in the face of an acceptance of over a century 
under the possibifity and the right of abrogation. on a year's notice at any 
time the strict provisions of the treaty should prove unsatisfactory, was in 
itself originally a modification of the practice, if not of the rule, of Inter-
national Law, a practice whose aim and purpose have been but fortified 
and strengthened in the later development of that science. 
The determination of political questions lies within the realm of the 
political department of the government, whether of the executive or legis-
lative branch, and that decision is not subject to review by ~he courts. Cf. 
Mooiu:, op. cit, V. 241-242, and cases there cited. The Supreme. Court in 
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (SCOTT, CAs:Es, p. 40), held that the 
determination of sovereignty by the political department was binding upon 
the judges, other officers, and citizens. Cf. other cases there cited. Other 
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cases are The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 665; Fifield v. Ins. Co., 47 Pa. St. 166, 
172 in Scott's Cases; also Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, where it was 
held that the decisions on foreign relations made by the political department 
were binding upon the country. (SCOTT, CAsts, p. 728, 729.) The court 
held in re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 502-505 (Mooll, op. cit., V. 744), that 
there could be no judicial review of the action of the political department 
upon such questions, basing its opinion upon Willia111s v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 
3 Sumner, 270, and other cases there cited. In North American Commercial 
Co. v. Ut1ited States, 171 U. S. IIO, the i:ourt recognized the arbitral award 
and the correspondence of the government as binding upon it. In the 
matter of the interpretation of treaties the courts are bound by the known 
decisions of the political department; and this principle is more clearly 
se.en where the interpi;etation put upon the treaty by the political depart-
ment has been set forth in the course of diplomatic reclamation. In Foster 
v. Neilson,· 2 Pet. 253, "the court refused to go into the merits of the 
treaty, . holding itself bound by the decision of the political department of 
the government. * * * 'We tliink, then, however individual judges might 
construe the Treaty . of St. Ildefonso, it is the province of the court to con-
form its decisions to the will of the legislature, if that will has been 
clearly expressed.'" Scott, CASts, pp. 75-76. Nor can the Supreme Court 
enforce a. treaty, if .the government decides to disregard it. Botiller v. 
Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, and other cases there cited, in Mooll, op. cit., 
V. 243. 'In the principal case Waddili, J., said, "The weight that should 
be given to the opinion and ruling of the secretary of state * * * in con-
struing the Prussian treaty, need not be dwelt upon * * * .further than 
to say that it bas special significance as a decision and ruling of the ex-
ecutive Qranch of the government, having to do with international matters, 
invoked by the German government, in this very matter.'' 234 Fed. 396. 
'fhe interpretation put upon the Prussian Treaty by the Secretary of State 
was, therefore, binding upon the courts. Since by that interpretation the 
Appam had no right to entry under the circumstances, such entry con-
situated a violation of American neutrality; and the courts, ,called upon in 
the libel suits to take cognizance of the case, had to proceed to judgment 
accordingly. 
"'\Vhen a captured vessel is brought or voluntarily comes infra praesidia 
of the neutral power, that power has the right to inquire whether its own 
neutrality has been violated by the capture, and if so it is bound to restore 
the property.' La Estrella, 4 Wheaton 298; La Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheaton 
385; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dallas 157; Betsey Cathcart, Bee. 292." HALL, INT. 
LAW, p. 625; cf. also HAuTtl!tUILLt, op. cit., L 36o-361. In the past, it is 
true, but two main classes of such cases have come up for adjudication, 
captures in neutral territory, and captures by vessels fitted out in neutral 
ports (cf. HALL, op. "cit., pp. 624-:625; La Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton 
283) ; but it is submitted that it is the fact of the violation of neutrality-
and not the manner of the violation, which is conceived to be a question 
of quite secondary importance-which entails the penalty. The Vice-Ad-
miralty Court at Halifax held in the case of The Chesapeake that "for a 
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belligerent to bring an uncondemned prize into a neutral port to avoid re-
capture [as seems to have been the motive in the principal case] is such 
a grave offense against the neutral state that it ipso facto subjects the prize 
to forfeiture, and * * * the vessel should be restored to the owners on 
the payment of costs." MooRt, op. cit, VII. 937. The holding of the court 
was, therefore, in line with the rulings and practice of over a century. 
Although the Supreme Court did not in the opinion handed down in 
the principal case expressly recognize that the interpretation put upon the 
Treaty by the political department of the government in the course of 
diplomatic reclamation was binding upon the courts, it is submitted that 
that principle governed in arriving at the decision. H. e. S. 
ENJOINING AN F~10N A't 'tHl': Sux-r or TAXPAn:R.-It is commonly 
stated that equity has not power to enjoin an election. McCRARv, ELi;:c-r10NS, 
3rd Ed. §351. This statement cannot be taken without some qualification. 
When the election is being held under a valid~law, the requirements of which 
are observed, there can be no doubt but that the injunction should be re-
fused. The question in such a case is a poltical one and equity will not 
interfere to decide questions which are truly of a political nature. Morgan 
v. Wetzel County Court, 53 W. Va. 3721 44 S. E. 1&l; Oden v. Barber, 103 
Tex. 4491 129 S. W. 6o2. But in cases where the election is to be held 
under an unconstitutional law, most of the cases hold that equity has juris-
diction to enjoin. Mayor, etc. of Macon v. Hughes, uo Ga. 795, 36 S. E. 
247; Connor v. Gray, 88 Miss. 4891 41 So. 186 (senible); contra, Illinois v. 
Galesburg, ~ Ill. ~5: The question in such a case is certainly a judical 
one and is capable of being tried by a court of equity. 
In a recent case, Power v. Ratliff (Miss. 1916), 12 So. 864 which was 
a combination of two suits to enjoin the submission to the vote of the peo-
ple of a prohibition law and a law providing for the appointment of game 
wardens, the relief was denied. In both suits the plaintiffs contended that 
the constitutional amendment which allowed a re(erendum was void· because 
not regularly passed. It was stated in the dissenting opinion that the 
amendment was clearly invalid because of the method of its adoption and 
this is tacitly adipitted in the prevailing opinion, which however did not 
consider this point. The majority opinion disposes of the case upon two 
grounds: one, that these particular plaintiffs have not sufficient interest in 
the r~sult to complain; two, that equity has no jurisdiction to grant the 
relief demanded. Having disposed of the first point, the decision on the 
second is unnecessary and is hence mere obiter dictum. 
However, the question of jurisdiction is an interesting one. It is of 
course, weli settled that equity will not enjoin the passing of an act by the 
legislature even though the act would be clearly unconstitutional if passed. 
McChord v. Louirville and N. R. Co., 183 U. S. ~3, 22 Sup. Ct. 165, 46 L. 
Ed. 28g; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 4711 
17 Sup. Ct 161, 41 L. Ed. 518. .This position is taken in order to prevent 
judicial interference with the functions of the legislature; there is also 
49:.Z MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
an . efficient remedy after the legislation is passed. This objection does not 
apply to an injunction against the submission of a measure under a ref-
erendum law. There is no interference with· the functions of a coordinate 
branch of the government. The legislature has already completed its action. 
The submission of a· measure to vote of the people cannot be regarded as 
an act of the legislature. The referendum vote is the act of the people 
and not of the legislature: there is no political objection to enjoining such 
an election if the provision under which the election is held, is unconstitu-
tional An injunction against the election in the principal case would pre-
vent an illegal, useless and expensive act without jarring the fine mechanism 
o~ our tri-branched system of. government. If no political question is in-
volved in the granting of the injunction it is difficult to see why a court 
of chancery cannot enjoin an illegal election. 
There is another question involved in the Power case, namely what in-
terest is sufficient upon the part of the plaintiff to entitle him to an in-
junction against an election. The first bill was brought by two taxpayers. 
'The submission o the voters was to be at a regular election and so the ad-
ditional expense and the additional tax burden on the plaintiffs was in-
significant. That a taxpayer is entitled to an injunction against an illegal 
election has been affirmed in: Mayor, etc. of Macon v. Hughes, supra; 
De Kalb County v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 727, 65 S. E. 72; and denied in 
Roudanea v. New Orleans, 29 La. Ann .. 271; M cAlister v. Millwee, 31 Okla. 
62o, 122 Pac. 173, 40 L. R. A. N. S. 576. The principal case is clearly dis-
tinguishable- from Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, in which case the court 
iienies equitable relief to secure to the plaintiff his right to vote and be 
voted for. The rights insisted upon in the Fletcher case are political ones 
and whether.equity should protect these rights depends in a large degree upon 
whether such rights are regarded as being civil as well as political as in 
the leading case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 950. There is a conflic~ 
as to whet4er the latter case is l~w in this country-the state courts are 
at variance on this point. Surely in those jurisdictions which recognize the 
doctrine of Ashby v. White, equity should protect the right to vote. The 
doctrine of the Fletcher case, however, has no application to the principal 
case. 
It was pointed out in People v. Galesburg, supra, that in t4e case of an 
invalid election of officials, there is an adequate remedy at law, i. e., by 
resorting· to the common law writ of quo warranto. But such a writ does 
not take care of the situation in the Power case. Moreover even where the 
election is of officials, the writ would not prevent the imposition of taxes 
to pay for the expenses of the election. Some of the courts intimate that 
equity should not enjoin the election, but only enjoin the payment of ex-
penses of tht: same. But why wait? It would be safer and more sensible 
to enjoin the election in the first instance. The court in the Power case in., 
tima~es that if tlie proposed election authorized bond issues, or directly 
affected plaintiffs' property rights, it would consider that the plaintiffs were 
in a position to complain. But there are property rights involved ; in par-
ticular instances, the additional tax resulting from the expenses of the 
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illegal election might be considerable. It is true that Judge Cooley said in 
Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 549, that a single taxpayer has no right to com-
plain until the amount is assessed against him. The learned judge bases 
his argument upon public policy; the public welfare demands that a whole 
assessment should not be enjoined. It is inconceivable that he would apply 
the rule to such a case as the principal one. Surely it does not interfere with 
the public welfare to enjoin an election which is useless at the best. Even if 
each taxpayer would have a remedy at law for the recovery of taxes which 
he was wrongly forced to pay, equity should grant an injunction to prevent 
multiplicity of suits. This point is developed in Mayor, etc. of Macon v. 
Hughes, supra. This much cannot obe doubted: that equity has jurisdiction 
to enjoin an election which is clearly illegal; that it can do so at the suit 
of a taxpayer without doing violence to the theories upon which equity 
grants relief; and that in so doing a desirable result is obtained without 
interfering with political affairs. T. E. A. 
. WHA'r Savicii Gms JURISDICTION IN PttsoN.-On March 6th, 1917, the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of McDonald v. Mabee, 
reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, in 175 S. W. 676, held 
that a judgment in foreclosure proceedings in which the defendant was 
served only by publication did not merge the cause of action so as to bar 
a suit on the original notes for the balance unpaid by the sale of the mort-
gaged property on the foreclosure, although the statute of the state declared 
such service sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam, and the defendant 
was a citizen of the state and bound by the law so far as it was constitutional. 
The only case in the United States squarely sustaining the Texas decision 
on similar facts, so far as the writer is aware, is the often cited case of 
Henderson v. Staniford (1870), 105 Mass. 504 7 Am. Rep. 551, in which it 
was held that action on the original cause was barred by the plaintiff re-
covering a judgment in a suit in California, where the parties resided, and 
in which the defendant was served only by publication. The court said 
that if the service so made was defective the defendant could waive the 
defect, and did so by urging the judgment as a defence. It is no doubt 
true that a defendant can waive service by appearing in the suit, as is 
done every day; but this defendant did and proposed no such thing; and 
no appearance by him even if made could cure the defect unless such ap-
pearance were entered before judgment, so as to confer jurisdiction on 
the court to render the judgment. That a judgment recovered by such 
service was no bar, and was not available as a defence against a new action 
on the original cause, had, at the time this decision was rendered, been 
held in other states. Whittier v. Wendell (1834), 7 N. H. 257; Middlesex 
Bank v. Butman (1848), 29 Me. 19. Thus considered, the decisiort of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Mabee would seeI'll 
to affirm a doctrine sufficiently clear on principle to require neither proof 
nor precedent to support it, were it not for the decisions to the contrary cited.· 
But these decisions are nat so contrary as they seem; fol' they were rendered· 
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on the assumption that such a service gives jurisdiction, and it is in that 
regard that the present case is of the greatest interest. 
The notion has persisted in many quarters that statutes may enable 
courts to acquire jurisdiction to give judgments in personam against per-
sons who have neither appeared nor been served with personal notice within 
the jurisdiction to appear and defend, whereby to put them in default. 
There are the cases of Lucas v. Wilson (1881), 67 Ga. 356, and Hulbert v. 
Thomas (1887), 55 Conn. 181, 10 Atl. 556, 3 Am. St. Rep. 43, in which 
judgments rendered on such service were affirmed in the Supreme Court 
because the requirements of the statute had been complied with, no inquiry 
being raised as to whether or not the statutes were constitutional. Then 
there are such cases as Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1907), 225 Ill. 
i97, 8o N. E. 109, in which it was held that judgment against a corporation 
on such service was good beeause such was the service provideq by the 
statute, and the defendant by citizenship is bound by the laws of the state. 
The facts are that the defendant was an Illinois corporati9n, agreeing to be 
bound by such service by copsenting to be a corporation under that .law, 
and therefore bound by the agreed method of service. The same would be 
true if it were a foreign corporation and accepted the .permission given by 
the state to do business in the state on condition of consenting to accept 
service of that sort. The same would be true of a natural person who gives 
a judgment note,. providing that if not paid when due the payee may appoint 
an agent to app~r and confess judgment against the maker to the amount 
of the note, interest, and costs. Such a judgment is valid, not because the 
legislature could legalize such a method of· service, but because the party 
has expressly agreed to be bound by such service. It has been suggested 
that the same logic applies to natural persons, that by consenting to be 
citizens of the state they agree .. to be bound by its laws; but that is not 
true, they are citizens whether they will or no. We· were not consulted as 
to who~ we would .choo:;e for parents or where we preferred to be born, 
assuming that we could have made a legal choice at that time. Even Mr .. 
Justice Field's concession in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. ~14. 735, that 
a statute of a state providing that non-residents doing a partnership business 
in the state should be bound 'by indirect service, has since been repudiated, 
because such legislation denies equal protection of the law. Fle~er v. Far-
son (1915), 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327. 
In the English courts it is quite clearly established that legislation pro-
viding for less than per~onal notice to confer jurisdiction in personam is 
valid, and will be given effect. Thus there is the leading case of Douglas v. 
Forrest (1824), 4 Bing. (13 E. C. L.) 686, an action on a Scotch judgment 
against a Scotchman, in which it was held that a service consisting only of 
calling him in open court, at separate terms, to appear and calling in public 
in the market-square of Edinburgh and ·at the sea-shore after he had gone 
to India, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment 
against him' in personam which would sustain an action of debt in England, 
because the service was according to the law of Scotland, to which the de.; 
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fendant owed allegiance. Again, in Bocquet v. MacCarthy (1831), 2 Barn. & 
Ad. (22 E. C. L.) 951, it was held that a statute of a British colony provid-
ing that in all actions against an absent party process might be served by 
delivering the same to the king's attorney, without requiring him to forward 
it to the party, was not so repugnant to the principles of natural justice as 
to prevent the English court maintaining an action of debt on a judgment 
rendered by a court of the colony against a citizen of the colony on such 
a service. The same has been held in an Irish court of a French judgment 
bf France: Maubourquet v. Wyse (1867), I Ir. Rep. C. L. 471. 
But the writer has always maintained that these decisions do not ex-
press the accepted law of the United States, and that here no state can 
confer on its courts jurisdiction to render judgments in personam on any 
less service than personal service on the party to be charged, and that 
within the confines of the state. This view is supported by the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, first in the case of Webster v. Reid 
(1850, II How. (52 U. S.) 437, in which plaintiff claimed title to land 
by sale under execution on a judgment recovered for se~ce of the com-
missioners appointed to partition the half-breed Indian lands, n9,ooo acres. 
The commissioners not being paid for their services sued "The Owners of 
the Half-Breed Indian Lands," had process sen•ed by publication according 
to the law of the territory, took judgment for the amount of their services, 
had execution levied on all the lands, had them sold, and Reid claimed title 
by virtue of such sale. The court held the judgment and sale void, and 
Mr. Justice McLean in giving the opinion of the court said: "These suits 
were not a proceeding in rem against the land, but were in personam against 
the owners of it. Whether they all resided within the territory or not does 
not appear, nor is it a matter of any importance. No person is required to 
answer in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property 
has not been attached. In this case there was no personal notice, nor an 
attachment or other proceeding against the land until after the judgments. 
The judgments, therefore, are mere nullities and did not authorize the 
executions on which the land was sold." The observation ·that the rule is 
the same as to citizens and non-residents is worthy of particular note; and 
the same sentiment was emphatically repeated by Mr. Justice Field in Pen-
noyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714 But because the defendant in that case 
happened to be a .non-resident, .many persons have said the decision Inight 
have been different had the defendant been a citizen of the state, basing 
their opinions on the English decisions above referred to, and the notion 
that the state may provide some substitute for personal service in the case 
of its own citizens. This qualification has been most explicitely denied in 
the Supreme Court of California in DeLaMontanya v. DeLaMontanya (18g6), 
u2 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345, 53 Am. ·st. 165, 32 L. R. A. 82, holding void a 
decree for alimony and custody of children against a citizen of the state · 
on service by publication according to the requirements of a statute declaring 
that such service should be sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam; and 
similar rulings have been made in other states: Rahar v. Rahar (19n), 150 
Iowa 5II, 129 N. W. 494 Ann. Cas. 1912D, 68o; Moss v. Fitch (1go8), 212 
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Mo. 484, III S. W. 475, 126 Am. St. 568. In Smith v. Grady (1887), 68. 
Wis. 215, 31 N. W. 477, it was held that a, judgment against a citizen of 
Ontario rendered on service on the debtor personally in the state of Wis-
consin, in compliance with the laws of Ontario was not entitled to respect 
sufficient to prove a claim against the estate of the defendant therein in the 
probate courts of \Visconsin. In Grubel v. Nassauer (1913), 210 N. Y. 149, 
103 N. E. u13, it was held that an action was not maintainable on a judg-
ment rendered by a court of the German Empire against a citizen of Germany 
on service according to the law of that country, after he had sailed to 
America.1 
1 In Wilson v. Seligman (1892), 144 U. S. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. 541, after return of 
execution unsatisfied against a corporation, an order was made on motion, according 
to the provisions of the statute of the state, that execution issue against the 
stockholders, including defendant as one, and notice of this motion was personally 
served on him outside of the state; be did not appear, aµd on default an order 
was mllde finding him to be a stockholder and liable for the judgment, and awarding 
execution against him. The statute required "sufficient notice in writing to the 
persons sought to be charged." On this order action was brought against the 
defendant in this case, and judgment for defendant was affirmed on writ of 
error to the Supreme Court of the United States. GRAY, J., • • • "In the case 
at bar the defendant never resided in Missouri, and was not served with process 
within the state, either upon the original writ against the corporation or upon the 
motion for execution against him. He· denies that he was a stockholder; and 
the question whether he was one was not tried or decided in the controversy 
between the plaintiff and the corporation, nor involved in the judgment recovered 
by one of those parties against the. other. Under the statute of Missouri, and upon 
fundamental principles of jurisprndence, 'be is entitled to legal notice and trial 
of the issue before he can be charged with personal liability." 
Amsbaugh v. Eschange Bank of Maquoketa (1885), 33 Kan. 100, 5 Pac. 3$.i, 
was an action on two judgments rendered against defendant in the circuit court 
of Jackson County, Iowa, on process served there on defendant's wife at the 
house where be bad resided, a week after his departure with intent never to return. 
He left November 4' and the processes were served November 12 and 14 following. 
Judgment for plaintiff reversed on error, because jtidgments were void. The 
court held that a judgment rendered on such service was not entitled to any 
respect in any other state even if the service was according to the law of the 
state where it was rendered; because defendant bad abandoned his residence 
before process was served, and. therefore was beyond the jurisdiction. 
Ross v. Fitch· (1908), 212 Mo. 484' III S. W. 475, 126 Am. St. 568, was a 
decree for divorce, alimony, and custody of children, on process served only 
on defendant personally in another state, according to the law of' this state; and 
sale of land on execution thereon. The divorce purchaser at the sale sued to clear 
the title. GRAVES, J. "To our mind the legislature had no intent of giving the 
service in section 592 a broader scope than that of publication, but was simply 
providing another method of accomplishing the same thing; i. e., giving some kind 
of a notice that the court had seized the res, whether that res was property or 
the inarriage status, and would proceed to determine the rights of the parties 
tn and to the res •• • • • We repeat that, whatever may be the holdings elsewhere, 
our court place$ the acquisition ot jurisdiction upon which a penonal judgmeut 
can be rendeted upon the fact of personal service of the party with process in 
this state. In other words, 110 process issued by the courts of this state a11d 
served upon the party defendant in another state can be the basis of a personal judg· 
ment. And this is true whether the parly in fact is a citizen of this stale or of 
a"othlt .Jtatl. n · 
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In rendering the opinion in the case of McDonald v. Mabee, Mr. Justice 
Hor.MES makes a concession not heretofore admitted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, that something a little short of personal service might 
constitute due process of law, within the protection of he constitution. This 
concession may be due to the fact that there are to be found on the statute 
books of nearly all the states provision for service of process by leaving a 
copy at the residence of the defendant with some member of the . family 
:if suitable age and discretion. Mr. Justice Hor.MES says: "Perhaps in 
·view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in the 
state a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been 
enough. * * * It is going to the extreme to hold such power gained by 
service at the last and usual place of abode." · The writer is not aware of 
any case in which the constitutionality of a statute providing for acquisition 
of jurisdiction by such mode of service has yet been sustained. J. R R 
Pow:ER ol' A NA'l'IONAL BANK 'l'O FouND A PSNSION FUND FOR EMPI.O\'SSS.-
Within the last decade in the United States there has been a marked in-
crease in the profit sharing plans, the pension plans, and the general welfare 
work done by business corporations for their employees. Whether this has 
been due more to beneficent motives than to pure business foresight it is 
evident that many business men consider such investments good ones for a 
corporation from a purely financial viewpoint. "The pension plan attaches 
the employees to the service and decreases the liability of a strike * * * it 
makes more certain the continuance of efficient men in the lines of work 
with which they are familiar * * * the incentive to good conduct is greatly 
increased." F. A. V AND:ERI.IP, quoted in SQUI:ER, Or.D Acs DsPSNDENCY IN 'l'Ht 
U:t·.-X'l'SD S'l'A'l'SS. Ch. III. Although there has been considerable debate con-
cerning economic aspects, it does not appear that the question whether such 
work is ultra vires the ordinary business corporation has been much before 
the courts. 
In Hein:: v. National Bank of Commerce (1916), 237 Fed. 942, the 
Federal Court of Appeals had to determine whether a national bank had 
the power to provide a pension fund for its officers and employees. The 
shareholders had authorized the directors to create such a fund, but it was 
contended by the plaintiff, a shareholder who asked an injunction against 
the payment of a lump sum agreed upon in lieu of the pension granted to 
a retiring president of the bank, that the bank was wholly without power 
to found such a fund, and hence as the provision was ultra vires and void, 
the contract to pay the agreed sum was without consideration. In reaching 
its conclusion the court considered that the judgment of the stockholders 
and directors, though not conclusive, was entitled to some weight on the 
question whether such action was within the implied powers of the bank. 
It recognized that such plans were deemed good business policy in effecting 
an increase in the character of the service and the loyalty of the .employee$, 
and held that the power to create such a fund as a business detail was 
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included in the clause of the National Banking Act "and all such incidental 
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." 
It is well settled that the test of whether a power is impliedly granted 
to an ordinary business corporation is whether it is one reasonably incident 
to and necessary to the carrying out of the express powers granted. THOMP-
SON, CoRFoRATioNs, §21o8, and cases cited, and where the exercise of the 
power is unchallenged by the state and not prohibited by its charter or the 
corporation laws of the state, if it has a reasonable tendency to aid in the 
accomplishment of one or more of the corporate purposes it will be held 
intra vires. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 Fed. 843, 38 C. C. A. 433. 
It need be necessary only in the sense of being appropriate, convenient, and 
suitable-including a right of reasonable choice of the names to be employed. 
Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Capital Dairy Co., 6o Oh. St.¢, 53 N. E. 7u; Flaherty 
v. Portland etc. Society, 99 Me. 253, 59 Atl. 58; State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 
537; Malone v. Lancaster Gas etc. Co., 182 Pa. St. 309, 37 Atl. 932; 3 THOMP-
SON, CoRPORATIONS, §2IIO and cases cited. In Jacksonville etc. Ry. Co. v. 
Hooper, l6o U. S. 514 40 L Ed. 515, it was said: "This doctrine ought to 
be reasonably and not unreasonably understood and applied, and whatever 
may fairly be regarded as inCidental to, or consequential upon those things 
which the legislature has authorized ought not, unless expressly prohibited, 
to be held by judicial construction to be ultra vires." See Atfy Gen. v. Great 
Eastern Ry., 5 App. Cas. 473. That the modem tendency of the great ma-
jorify of courts is in this direction, see l CooK, CORPOllATIONS, §3 and cases 
cited. 
National banks are corporations of limited capacity having no powers 
except such as are given them expressly or by necessary implication by the 
Acts of Congress passed in relation to such banks. Calif. Nafl Bank v. 
Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 42 L. Ed. 198; Nafl Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 
67, 35 L. Ed. 107; Bailey v. Farmer's Nafl Bank, 97 Ill. App. 66: 7 C. J. 807. 
The statute provides that. national banking associations may exercise "all 
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking." U. S. R.£\r. STAT., §5136 (7). These incidental powers so granted 
have been interpreted to mean those incidental to the things authorized by 
the Banking Act and not such as are incidental to the banking institutions 
generally. Seligman v. Charlottesville Nat. Bank, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,642, 
3 Hughes 647. It is evident, however, from the decisions construing this 
clause, that the courts do not understand that this limitation is to be so in-
terpreted as to prevent a national bank from operating according to recognized 
good business principles unless it is very clear that such was intended to be 
prohibited. The courts will not prevent a national bank from being a good 
business man except on clear grounds. Accordingly although the Banking 
Act expressly prohibits a national bank from purchasing or dealing in the 
stock of other corporations (National Bank v. Hawkins,_ 179 U. S. 364, 43 
L. Ed. 1007; Calif. Nafl Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 462, 42 L. Ed. 198), 
yet such prohibition bas been construed to apply to dealing in the sense of 
speculation, and it has been held that a national bank may loan money on 
stock as security (Calif. Naf~ Bank v. Kennedy, supra) or take such stock 
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as a compromise to avoid apprehended loss. Nat'l Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 
628, 25 L. Ed. 448. Also that a national bank may enter into a contract 
~ith the promoter of a building corporation subscribing for stock in the 
corporation, which the promoter agreed to repurchase later, where the con-
tract was made as a part of a transaction looking to the securing of adequate 
and suitable banking offices. Nashville Nat'l Bank v. Stahlman, 178 S. W. 
942, 132 Tenn. 367. A national bank may purchase and hold only such real 
rstate as is necessary for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of 
its banking business (U. S. RJW. STAT. §5137), but under this statute such 
bank has been held to have the power to erect a building for its own use, 
and in so doing is not limited to the construction of a building to be used 
solely for its banking quarters (Brown v. Schleier, u8 Fed. g81, 55 C. C. A. 
475), but may erect a larger building than it requires and rent the space 
it does not occupy. Wingert v. National Bank, 175 Fed. 739. 
Cases involving the implied power of corporations to provide for pension 
funds, insurance plans, and such welfare work are relatively few. An implied 
power will be ascribed to a corporation employing labor to incur expense 
on account of injuries to their employees in the line of their employment, 
Toledo etc. Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188, 95 Am. Dec. 484- And, 
it seems, to establish funds for hospitals for the benefit of sick and in; 
jured employees. Eckman v. Ry: Co., 169 Ill. 312, 48 N. E. 4g6; Pittsburg 
etc. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 152 Ind. 345, 53 N. E. 290; Pittsburg etc. Ry. Co. v. 
Co~, 55 Oh. St. 497, 45 N. E. 641; Vickers v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 
139; Ringle v. Penn. R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 529, 30 Atl. 492. So also they may 
organize relief associations with a provision for a stipulated sum to be paid 
the family in case of the death of an employee in service. Harrison v. Mid-
land Ry. Co., 144 Ala. 246, 40 So. 394; Maine v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa 
26o, 70 N. W. 630; State v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 68 Oh. St. 9,.67 N. E. 93; 
Beck v. R. R. Co., 63 N. J .L. 232. It is not ultra vires for a corporation to 
use its funds to establish a free library and free books for its employees. 
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718, 17 Misc. Rep. 43. 
It does not appear that the validity of a national bank pension fund. 
established under the implied powers of the bank has been passed upon 
before in this country. In England a pension granted pursuant to the resolu-
tion of a bank's stockholders authorizing the directors to pay a certain half-
yearly pension to•the family of a deceased president was held intra vires. 
Henderson v. Bank, Law Reports, 40 Ch. Div. 170. In considering the ques-
tion the court deemed evidence that among· banking men the granting of 
such pensions was considered good business practice of some importance 
as showing it was a business detail a choice of which was permissible. In 
Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. Supp. 788, the New York Su-
preme Court held that the trustees of a mutual life insurance company did 
not have the power to agree to pay a retiring president a salary for life in 
.consideration of past services rendered by him. The above case is easily 
distinguishable from the principal case in that in the former there was no 
provision for the pension until after the whole service of the pensioner was 
over and the pension was not authorized by the stockholders of the company. 
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On consideration of the trend of modem decisions to the effect that, where 
the state does not object, a corporation will not be prevented from carrying 
on its business details according to good business principles unless such is 
clearly ultra vires, and also giving some weight to the growing opinion 
among business men that the founding of such a pension fund is a good 
financial investment for a corporation, it would seem clear that the decision 
of the principal case is correct. H. S. K. 
RECOVJ>RY IN QUASI-CON'l'RACT FOR B:i>NEFI'l'S PROCURl>D BY FRAUDUL'£N'l' 
MAfuuAG:i>.-The plaintiff had gone through forms of marriage with the 
defendant's intestate, honestly believing she was marrying him, while he 
knew that he had a living wife and therefore could not marry. They lived 
together as man and wife until his death, and it was not until after such 
death that she learned that he had a prior wife still living. In a suit for 
money advanced and services rendered, she was given a verdict for both 
claims. Held, .that the judgment on such verdict should be affirmed. Sand-
ers v. Ragan (N. C. 1916), 90 S. E. 777. 
No question was raised as to the money advanced, the advance presumably 
being regarded as evidence of a genuine contract of loan. The appeal was 
concerned only with the recovery for the services. It is apparent that the 
services were rendered in the mistaken belief that the status of the plaintiff 
imposed upon her a duty toward the defendant's intestate; and since, if her 
status had been what she believed it to be, she would have owed such serv-
ices to her husband, her mistaken belief which induced her to render the 
services was a mistake of fact which affected not merely the policy of 
what she should do, but rather her legal duty as a wife. The plaintiff's 
case was made still stronger by the fact that her ignorance of her true 
status was the result of the husband's fraudulent misrepresentations. To so 
induce a person to enter into a void marriage was an actionable wrong for' 
whic)l the wrongdoer was liable in an action for fraud and deceit How-
ever, that right of action in tort died with the tort-feasor; and after the 
tort-feasor's death, the plaintiff could recover; if at all, only in assumpsit for 
the value of the services rendered. Accordingly, the court deciding the 
principal ease allowed recovery in assumpsit on the ground that the de-
fendant's intestate had been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense. 
When money not justly due has been paid under a plain mistake of fact, 
which money would have been actually due if the facts had existea as be-
lieved, recovery has been generally allowed. Stuart v. Sears, II9 Mass. 143; 
Lane v. Pere Marq1tette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 63, 28 N. W. 786; Simms v. 
Vick, 151 N. C. 78, 65 S. E. 621, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 517. And it seems, in 
the absence of adjudication on the question, that if the element of :fraud 
were absent in the principal case, recovery should be allowed on such facts 
far services rendered, in the same way that recovery of money was allowed 
1n the cases cited supra. But in the case under discussion, fraud is at the 
v.ery basis of the mistake. The general rule is that when one by fraud 
induees amther to pay him money not justly due, the person so wronged 
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may bring either an action in tort or contract, the former asking damages 
on the ground of deceit, the latter asking restitution of benefits unjustly· 
obtained by means of deceit. Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 Pac. 783; 
Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334, I L. R. A. N. S. 176; Johnson 
v. Seymour, 79 Mich. 156, 44 N. W. 344- When the wrongdoer has by his 
fraud procured a benefit in the form of services, there would seem to be· 
equal reason for permitting restitution as an alternative remedy for the tort,· 
;md this has been permitted in numerous cases; though, by reason of the 
fictitious forms of pleading in general assumpsit, some courts have been led 
to make an invidious distinction between the claim for money had and· 
received and that for labor or for goods. WooDWAF.D, LAW OJ! QUASI-CON-
TRACTS, §§273-2j7-281. 
Upon the precise problem involved in the principal case it may be stated 
that the authorities are plainly in conflict. WOODWARD, LAW OJ! QuASI-
CoNTRACTS, §§184, 282; KsN:ER, QuAsr-CoNTRACTS, 318. After a dis-
cussion of this conflict in decisions the court in the principal 
case concluded that services rendered in reliance upon the fraud-
ulent misrepresentations of the defendant's intestate should be treated 
in the same way as money paid under any specie~ of fraud, and accordingly 
allowed recovery in assumpsit as stated above. This view on the same state 
of facts is supported by both textwriters and authorities. WooDWAF.D, LAW 
ol! QuASI-CoNTRACTS, §§184 282; Ks£1''r:R, QUASI-CONTRACTS, 318; Po~ v. 
Dawson's Curator, 8 Martin (La.) 94; Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 493. Sim-
ilarly, a slave has been allowed to recover for services rendered in the 
mistaken belief that he was not free, such mistake being the result of fraudu-
lent misrepresentations made by his former master; Kinney v. Cook, 4 Ill. 
232; Hickam v. Hickam, 46 Mo. App. 4g6; and a girl who worked as a 
member of the family was allowed to recover in Boardman v. Ward, 40 
Minn. 399, 42 N. W. 202, 12 Am. St. Rep. 749. 
However, it must be admitted that the opposite view is also supported 
by eminent authorities. In the case of fraudulent marriage, recovery for 
services rendered was denied in Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 
8g2, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721; and in Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 32 Atl. 948, 
48 Am. St. Rep. 215, 33 L. R. A. 418; a slave was denied recovery in Frank-
lin v. Waters, 8 Gill (Md.) 322; and a girl who was told that she was an 
adopted daughter 'was allowed no compensation in Graham v. Stanton, 77 
Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023. The chief reasons for denying relief in the cases 
of Cooper v. Cooper and Payne's Appeal were "(1) that the tort of inducing 
one to enter into a void marriage is essentially a personal injury to which 
the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer is merely incidental; and (2) that 
the value of the benefits obtained by the defendant is only a single item of 
consequential damages which cannot be separated from the wrong itself 
and made the sole basis of an action by the person wronged." WooDWAF.D, 
LAW ol! QUASI-CONTRACTS, §282. These reasons are best disposed of by 
the same writer who says: "In answer to the first, it is submitted that if 
a wrongdoer is benefited at his victim's expense, to any extent whatever, 
the relative insignificance of such benefit, as compared with the injury· suf· 
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fered by his victi.m, affords no reason for denying to the latter the right 
to elect an action for restitution instead of an action for damages. As to 
the second, it may be pointed out that the plaintiff, in electing to sue for 
restitution, does not separate the consequential benefit to the defendant 
from the wrong committed by him. The very foundation of the action 
for restitution is the fraud of the defendant in inducing the plaintiff to 
enter into the void marriage; and the only essential difference between the 
action of assumpsit and that of deceit in such a case, is that in the former 
the plaintiff seeks to recover the value of the benefits resulting to the de-
fendant, white in the latter he demands compensation for the damages re-
sulting to himself." 
It naturally fotlows that the value of alt benefits conferred upon the 
plaintiff by the wrongdoer must be deducted from the value of the services 
rendered by the plaintiff, for the retention of a benefit is not unjust to the 
extent that such services have been paid for. The benefits conferred upon 
a plaintiff might be in some cases so great as to prevent any recovery for 
services. It should be noted in this connection that it is no more difficult 
for the jury to make the deduction when the action is in assumpsit than it 
is where the action is in tort for deceit. H. G. G. 
Atsrn~c PUlU'OSI! AS A Jusrmc\r10N FOR Exr:RCISI! oF PoLICI! Powr:a.-
Whether or not aesthetic considerations justify the exercise of the police 
power is a question which has already engaged the minds of the courts, and 
which we venture to say witt more frequently be involved in their opinions 
as time passes. The recent case of Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 37 Sup. 
Ct. 190, sustained the constitutionality of the fo11owing ordinance of the 
city of Chicago: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation 
to erect or construct any billboard or signboard in any block or any public 
street in which one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used 
exclusively for residence purposes without first obtaining the consent in 
writing of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a 
majority of the frontage of the property on both ·sides of the street in 
the block in which such billboard or signboard is to be erected, constructed, 
or located." The same .decision had been reached by the Supreme Court. 
of the State of Illinois, Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Itl. 344, 
lo8 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 488. In that opinion, wherein the ordinance 
is ·upheld as a reasonable exercise of police power, the court is careful to 
distinguish the facts from those involved in Haller Sign Works v. Physical 
Culture School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L. R. A. N. S. ggS. The 
statute in the latter case was held to have no relation to the safety, ·health, 
morals or general welfare of the pU'blic but to have been passed solely from 
aesthetic considerations, and was therefore considered invalid. 
The Federal Supreme Court in its decision does not find it necessary 
to discuss the effect that it would give a statute which had been passed out 
of regard for aesthetic purposes, but adopts the finding of the state court 
that "fires had been started in the accumulation of combustible material 
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which gathered about such billboards; that offensive and insanitary accumu-
lations are habitually found about them, and that they afford a convenient 
concealment and shield for immoral practices, and for loiterers and crim-
inals." It is apparent however that these are not the only objections to 
billboards; they form convenient arguments for sustaining the validity of 
regulations passed under the police power, as a relation can be shown be-
tween the purpose of such statutes and the "health, morals, and safety of 
ftie public." If the ordinance in question had also provided, as is done in 
'some cities, that billboards must be constructed of sheet-iron or some other' 
non-inflammaible materials, and that there must be a space of at least four 
feet between the lower edge and the ground (St. Louis Gunning Advertising 
Co. v. St. LQuiS, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929) there would then be little 
danger from fire, the accumulation of waste matter would be lessened, and 
the danger of the use of such billboards as a scene of immoral practices 
and as a hiding place for criminals would be eliminated. The Federal Su-
preme Court y;ould have then been called upon to determine whether the 
police power may be constitutionally exercised in the restraint of acts of-
fensive to the aesthetic sense-a question which as yet it has not found 
necessary to decide. However conveniently and satisfactorily the decision 
may have been reached on the grounds assigned in the opinion, it would seem 
that the purpose prompting the passing of this ordinance was not so much 
the protection of adjoining owners from fires, criminals, etc., but rather 
to give them the power to refuse to permit billboards to be ere<:ted in close 
proximity to their residences if they found that such billboards were eye-
sores and as such impaired the enjoyment of their property or lessened the 
market value of the same. 
The authorities on this question seem to be almost unanimous in holding 
that aesthetic considerations alone will not justify the exercise of the police 
power. State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123, 128 Am. St. Rep. 670; 
People ex rel. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17, 
21 L. R. A. N. S. 735 with case-note; Haller Sign Co. v. Physical Culture 
School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 998 with case-note. 
The authorities are also clear on the proposition that private property 
cannot be taken under the power of eminent domain if the only public pur-
pose is an aesthetic one. Where a harbor line was established solely in order 
that an expensive and sightly bridge might not be hidden from view by 
buildings placed on each side of it, the court held that this was not a public 
purpose for which lands could be taken. Farut Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 6o 
Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. 590. Massachusetts passed a statute limit-
ing the height of buildings in the neighborhood of Copley Square in Boston 
to ninety feet, but it was provided that compensation should be made to all 
those sustaining damages to their property by reason of the limitation of 
height of buildings prescnl>ed by the act. The court in sustaining the statute 
stated: "It is argued by the. defendants that the legislature, in passing this 
statute, was seeking to preserve the architectural symmetry of Copley Square. 
If this is a fact, and if the statute is mer~ly for the benefit of individual 
property owners, the purpose does not justify the taking of a right in land 
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against the will of the owner. But if the legislature, for the benefit of the 
public, was seeking to promote the beauty and attractiveness of a public park 
in the capital of the commonwealth, and to prevent unreasonable encroach-
ments upon the light and air which it had previously received, we cannot 
say that the lawmaking power might not determine that this was a matter 
of such public interest as to call for an expendiure of public money, and to 
justify the taking of private property." The power of eminent domain 
cannot be used for a private purpose, and "if the statute is merely for benefit 
ot individual property owners," proposing to use the public funds to limit 
the height of adjacent buildii~gs and thus increase the value of private 
property, it would unquestionably be an improper use of the power of emi-
nent' domain. See Welsh v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, n8 Am. St. 
Rep. 523, 23 L. R A. N. S. n6o, affirmed in 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 
53 L. Ed. 923; Commonwealth v. Boston"Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 
6or, 6g L. R A. 817, 108 Am. St. Rep. 494-
Taxes levied to secure funds for the erection of art museums, monu-
ments, fountains, ornamental arches, and other purposes that would appeal 
only to the aesthetic sense have been upheld. If the object to be thus.ac-
complished is considered so essentially public as to justify the exercise of 
the taxing power of the state, why could not it also be said that private 
property is taken for a public purpose, and therefore it may be condemned 
through the exercise of eminent domain, where the purpose of taking is "to 
preserve the architectural symmetry of ·Copley Square?" 
To recur again to the question of whether or not under the police power 
a state might forbid objectionable billboards solely through the fact that 
they are offensive to the aesthetic sense, it will require no citation of cases 
to demonstrate the fact that an ordinance is consitutional which so limits 
my neighbor's right to use his property as not to offend my sense of hearing, 
e. g., an ordinance prohibiting. manufacturing plants in a residence district; 
likewise an ordinance which protects my sense of smell, e. g., a prohibition 
against the location of a livery-stable within a residence-block; my sense of 
taste is also protected, e. g., an upper riparian owner cannot so pollute the 
water as to make it less fit for my use when it shall have descended to me. 
Inasmuch as property in a res is not an absolute right to use the res in any 
conceivable way, but a right ·to its use only in conformity with what is 
regarded as proper and reasonable under the limits fixed for us by our 
compact with society, why cannot society just as it has protected our sense 
of hearing, smell and taste, also guard our sense of sight from being dis-
turbed by scenes that are as offensive to the eye as the forbidden noises are 
to the ear? fuuND, PoLICt Pow:ER, 182. The application of the maxim, "Sic 
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas," is gradually but surely being extended, 
and restraints on the use of property are now being submitted to without 
question which formerly might have been successfully opposed as a· depriva-
tion of property without due process. As civilization advances, the social 
compact must bring us into a closer relation one with another and our 
rights must become more and more limited as they will more and more 
co~e in conflict with equal or higher rights 0£ our neighbor. With the 
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progress of the people in education and refinement we may expect the appre-
ciation of the beautiful to be increased, and we can agree with the view 
taken by the Massachusetts court in a later decision : "It may be that in 
the development of a higher civilization, the culture and refinement of the 
people has reached the point where the educational value of the Fine Arts, 
as expressed and embodied in architectural symmetry and harmony, is so 
well recognized as to give sanction, under some circumstances, to the ex-
_ercise of this power even· for such purposes." Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 
"220, 23 L. R. A. N. S. n63, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 70 Atl. n3, 15 A. & E.. 
Ann. Cas. 1048. The weight of authority, however, as well as the decision 
in that case, is opposed to permitting the exercise of the police power in 
restraint of the use of property upon mere aesthetic considerations, and 
until public opinion has changed so as to support or demand such a decision, 
we may expect the courts to hold that the owner's right to use his land for 
the erection of billboards is more to be protected than his neighbor's right 
to a view unimpaired by. such ogstructions. W. L. 0. 
WHEN RtMAINDl!RS ARS VtsTtD AND WHF.N CoNTINGENT.-A settlement 
was made upon C for life, then upon Ch C for life, and thereafter to the 
use "of the eldest son of the said C, wife of the said Ch C, who shall 
b_e living at the time of the decease of the survivor of them, the said C 
and Ch C" for life, and "from and after the decease of such eldest son, to 
the use and behoof of the next eldest son * * * who shall be living at the 
time of the decease of the son so dying." Held: That the sons of C took, 
under the settlement, successive vested estates for life and not contingent 
life estates, and that, accordingly, the limitations to such sons were not void 
for violating the rule against perpetuities. In re Barbre's Settlement, 85 
L. J. Ch. 683. 
There is a well known rule of law that if possible all remainders will be 
regarded as vested rather than contingent. Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jae. 415. 
This rule or policy undoubtedly influenced this court in deciding the instant 
case as it did, and the only proper inquiry is whether it so influenced the 
court that the decision contravenes other and more definite rules of law: 
It has been said . that "a remainder is vested in A, when, throughout its 
continuance, A, or A and his heirs, have the right to the immediate posses._ 
sion, whenever and however the preceding freehold estates may determine; 
a remainder is contingent, if, in order for it to come into possession, the full 
fillment of some condition precedent other than the determination of the 
preceding freehold estates is necessary." GRAY, Ruu AGAINST PERPtTUTIES. 
(3rd. Ed.) §101. This condition precedent, other than the determiiiation of 
the preceding freehold estates, which must be fulfilled before a contingent 
estate becomes vested, may be either the ascertainment of who is to be the 
remainder-man, or the happening of an event which must transpire before 
there be any possibility of the contingent remainder coming into possession 
should the preceding freehold estate cease. In other words an uncertainty 
of (1) person or (2) event may make the remainder contingent. Doe. d. 
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Planner v. Scudamore, 2 B. & P. 28g, 126 Eng. Rut. Cas. 1287; Boraston's Case, 
3 Co. Rep. I!)a, 76 Eng. Rut. Cas. 668; Starnes v. Hill, II2 N. C. I, 9, 16 
s. E. IOII. 
There is a definition of what should constitute a vested remainder which.....:. 
had it withstood criticism-would have made the decision of this case right 
beyond question. This is that provided there is a person in being, whether 
or not it be known just who he is, who would have an immediate right to 
the possession of the lands on the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent 
estate, his interest is vested. N. Y. Rm. STAT., pt 2, ch. I, tit 2, §13. 
Although this definition was sanctioned by Chancellor K:eNT, it is manifestly 
erroneous in not ntaking necessary a certainty as to who the remainder-man 
is, and after ~ome little recognition it has come to be regarded as erroneous. 
4 K:eNT. Coi.m. (12th Ed.) 203; Crorall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268; Kumpe v. 
Coons, 63 Ala, 448; Ginclrat v. Western Ry., g6 Ala. 162, II So. 372;. Smith 
v. West, 103 Itl. 332, (overruled in Temple v. Scott, 143 Itl. 290, 32 N. E. 366; 
Chapin v. Crow, 147 Itl. 219, 37 Am. St. Rep. 213, 35 N. E. 536; error ad-
mitted in Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370). Yet some statutes still 
regard this rule as good. 
There is some other seeming precedent for the court's decision. An 
English court has decided that, if the description can be interpreted as merely 
fixing the period at which the legatees shall take, the legacy is vested and 
not contingent Pearsall v. Simpson, i5. V es. 29, 33 Eng. Rul. Cas. 666. And 
an English court has said that where there is a limitation over which, though 
expressed in the form of a c~ntingent limitation, is in fact merely dependent 
upon a condition essential to the determination of the interests previously 
limited, the court is at liberty to hold that, notwithstanding the words in form 
import contingency, they mean no more than that the person to take under 
the limitation over is to take subject to the interests so previously limited. 
In order for this rule of construction to be applied, the condition upon which 
the limitation over is dependent must involve no incident but what is essen-
tial to the determihation of the interests previously limited. Maddison v. 
Chapman, 4 K. & J. 709, 3 De. G. & J. 536, 70 Eng. Rut. Cas. 294. 64 Eng. 
Rut. Cas. 30. Does the foregoing accord with the necessities of vested re-
mainders? If it means no more than that the remainder necessarily 
will vest through the clearing up of the uncertainties at or before the pre-
ceding freehold estates for any ,-eason determine, it may be regarded as 
correct; but if it means, as the court here took it to mean, that a description 
of a remainder-man is not a description at all, but mere surplusage provided 
it contains no incident other than those essential to the determination of the 
prior limitation by the death of the tenant, it is at the very least refusing to 
construe language used by the testator apparently for some purpose. Prob-
ably the former is the proper meaning of Maddison v. Chapman, supra, and the 
court in the instant case fell into error when construing it to apply to a 
condition which ·contained incidents not essential to every determination of 
the previous limitation. Manifestly in the instant case if the prior limita-
tion had failed for any reason other than the death of the tenant, who would 
then take would be insolvable, because until such teriant died who should be 
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the eldest son of C at the death of the prior holder could not be determined. 
Returning to GRAy's definition of a vested remainder, which may be taken 
as being as nearly final as any which has been promulgated, this remainder 
would be contingent for that in the event of some possible determinations 
of the particular estate there would be no one with an imme<liate right of 
possession. This is true if the testator meant by "living at the death" of the 
tenant of the particular estate what those words imply, rather than "living 
at the termination of the particular estate." If the court. is at liberty to so 
'change his words, where need they stop, and why need or should a person 
make a will? See 8 CoL. L. Rtv. 245; 24 LAW QuAR'l'. Rtv. 301; 8 ILL. L. R£v. 
225, 309, 404. 639; 5 Mxc:a:. L. Rtv. 497. ' H. J. C: 
